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ABSTRACT
The manageability and resilience of critical infrastructures,
such as power and water networks, is challenged by their in-
creasing interdependence and interconnectivity. Power net-
works often experience cascading failures, i.e. blackouts,
that have unprecedented economic and social impact. Al-
though knowledge exists about how to control such complex
non-linear phenomena within a single power network, little
is known about how such failures can spread and coevolve
in the water network when failing power components ener-
gize the water distribution infrastructure, i.e. pumps and
valves. This paper studies such a scenario and specifically
the impact of power cascading failures on shortages of water
supply. A realistic exemplary of an interconnected power-to-
water network is experimentally evaluated using a modular
simulation approach. Power and water flow dynamics are
simulated separately by taking into account different maxi-
mum power lines capacities and water demand requirements.
Results showcase the strong dependency of urban water sup-
ply systems on the reliability of power networks, with severe
shortages of water supply being caused by failures originat-
ing in distant power lines, especially for heavily loaded power
networks.
1. INTRODUCTION
Coupling critical infrastructures together, such as power
and water networks, puts at risk their resilience [7]. Power
networks can be highly vulnerable to components failures
that can cause cascading failures and influence other com-
ponents that energize pumps and valves of the water net-
work. The function of the latter influences the water supply
distribution in the whole network. These interdependen-
cies challenge the manageability of such coupled critical in-
frastructures as dynamics over interconnected networks are
fundamentally different and more complex than the ones
of isolated networks [12, 1]. Spreading and coevolving fail-
ures from one network to the other can cause unforeseen
economic damages and social unrest of an unprecedented
impact [2, 7].
Previous studies have shown the impact of failures of power
networks interconnected with Internet [6] and gas distribu-
tion networks [21]. 10] studied the effects of limited electrical
Copyright is held by author/owner(s).
power availability on water distribution for power-to-water
interconnected networks. The authors considered only static
power grid failure conditions, and focused on devising opti-
mal control strategies of the hydraulic components (pumps
and valves) to minimize impacts to customers.
On the other hand, this work explicitly considers power
flow dynamics to study the impact of power cascading fail-
ures on shortages of water supply. In other words, we are
concerned with bi-dimensional cascading effects where a fail-
ure in the power grid affects the dependent water network
by first propagating to the power nodes (load buses) ener-
gizing the hydraulic components. In this way, it is possible
to assess whether failures of power lines not directly linked
to the load buses may disrupt the operations of the intercon-
nected water network. To investigate this important issue,
we resort to a realistic synthetic example, and propose a
modular simulation approach where power and water flow
dynamics are simulated separately. Multiple experiments
are carried out to evaluate the impacts of the cascading fail-
ures for different maximum capacities of the power lines and
water demand requirements.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces
the case study studied in this paper–interconnected power-
to-water systems.. Section 3 illustrates the experimental
settings and evaluation conducted. Finally, Section 4 con-
cludes this paper and outlines future work.
2. CASE STUDY: AN INTERCONNECTED
POWER-TO-WATER SYSTEM
We consider a water distribution network that requires
interconnection with a power transmission network to en-
ergize its hydraulic components, such as pumps and valves.
These components are assumed to draw energy from cer-
tain load buses in the power network. We study the impact
of link failures in the power network on the capability of
the water distribution network to satisfy the water demand
of consumers. To this end we conduct a m− 1 contingency
analysis with respect to link failures in the power grid. Such
link failures may lead to cascading failures in the power grid.
If load buses that energize the water network are affected by
the initial power link failure, they will also affect the perfor-
mance of the water network.
2.1 Cascading failures in power networks
A cascading failure in a power network is typically a re-
sult of power flow redistribution over the network, after an
initial link has been tripped, see [19, 11]. The trigger for
such an event could be a cyberattack or a system failure.
The redistribution is a result of the physical laws that gov-
ern power systems. The lines that handle the redistributed
power flow also trip if they do not have enough capacity.
This can cause further power flow accumulation and spread
of the damage. A cascading failure can split the network
to several disconnected regions referred to as islands. The
maximum capacity of a line is imposed by thermal, stability
or voltage drop constraints. In our analysis we assume that
the maximum capacity Ci of each line i satisfies
Ci = αLi(0), (1)
where Li(0) denotes the initial load of line i, and α is the
tolerance parameter. Note that for α = 1 the initial system,
i.e. before the failures takes place, is fully loaded. This
entails that any increase in the load of line i results in a
failure.
2.2 Power-to-water interconnection
A water distribution network consists of several hydraulic
components—e.g., pipes, tanks, valves or pumps—some of
which (e.g., valves, pumps) are actually energized by a power
network. In the studied scenario of this paper, the water
network is energized by the power network which is expe-
riencing link failures. Each pump and actionable valve is
connected to a load bus of the damaged power network from
which they draw power. Cascading failures in the power net-
work may cause the deactivation of the load buses and the
interruption of power supply to the hydraulic components.
This, in turn, may cause localized or system-wide shortages
of water supply to customers.
2.3 Performance metric
The demand satisfaction ratio (DSR) evaluates the impact
of the power cascading failure on the coupled water network.
It is defined as the ratio between the volume of water sup-
plied ws,τ and demanded wd,τ in a given time horizon τ :
wτ =
ws,τ
wd,τ
. (2)
DSR varies between 0 and 1, where 0 means that no water
is supplied, and 1 that all demanded water is supplied [4].
3. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
This section illustrates the implementation choices, the
experimental settings as well as the evaluation results of our
power-to-water use case.
3.1 Implementation and experimental settings
For the evaluation we used the IEEE reference power net-
work1: case-118, which contains 118 nodes and 186 links.
Different values of the tolerance parameter α are evaluated,
with α ∈ {1, 1.2, 1.4, 1.6, 1.8, 2.0}. DC power flow analysis,
for faster performance and convergence, is performed via
1Available at http://www.pserc.cornell.edu/matpower
/docs/ref/matpower5.0/menu5.0.html (last access: Decem-
ber 2018). Case-118 consists of 118 buses, 19 generators, 35
synchronous condensers, 186 lines (including 9 transformers)
and 91 loads.
the InterPSS Zhou2007 backend2 of SFINA—the Simula-
tion Framework for Intelligent Network Adaptations [15, 14].
SFINA is a domain-independent software toolkit for model-
ing and simulation of the impact of failures and attacks on
such interdependent networks. It also allows for prototyping
self-management mechanisms3 to make such systems more
resilient. SFINA is an open source software implemented in
Java under the GPL-2.0 license and is accompanied with a
GUI4.
The water distribution network studied is the C-Town,
depicted in Fig. 1. The C-Town water distribution system
is one of the standard benchmark models employed in the
field of water distribution system analysis. It is based on
a real-world, medium-sized network with 429 pipes and 388
demand nodes [18]. Water storage and distribution in C-
Town is guaranteed by 7 tanks (T1 to T7), whose water
level controls the operations of one actionable valve (V1)
and 11 pumps, spread across 5 pumping stations (S1 to S5).
A key element of the network is Pumping station S1, which
draws water from the only source and delivers it to Tank
T1 as well as several demand nodes. Each pump and the
actionable valve are assumed connected to exactly one load
bus in case-118, from which they draw power.
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Figure 1: The C-Town water distribution system.
The choices for the water-power interlinks are loosely based
on overlaying C-Town on case-118. Table 1 shows the in-
terlinks between the C-Town hydraulic components and the
load buses of case-118. The hydraulic components are switched
off (pumps) or disabled (Valve V1) if the corresponding load
bus is not energized due to a cascading failure in the power
2SFINA currently supports four domain backends for net-
work flow calculations: (i) a disaster spread model [3], (ii)
MATPOWER [23] and (iii) InterPSS [22] power networks
simulation packages, and (iv) MATSim [8] for agent-based
transport simulations.
3Implemented applications include (i) general-purpose mon-
itoring and measurements of the network topology and
flow [19], (ii) simulation of cascading failures in power
grids [15] and (iii) coordinated smart transformers for self-
repairable smart grids [16].
4Available athttps://github.com/SFINA/GUI (last access:
December 2018)
network. In turn, this may affect the operations of C-Town,
with localized consequences or network-wide shortages of
water supply.
Table 1: Coupling of C-twon and case-118.
Hydraulic component Load bus
Pumping station S1 bus 108
Pumping station S2 bus 118
Pumping station S3 bus 70
Pumping station S4 bus 17
Pumping station S5 bus 20
Actionable valve V1 bus 83
The potential impact of power failures on the water dis-
tributed network are simulated with epanetCPA [17]; a tool-
box built around EPANET, which is the most widely used
open-source software for water distribution system analysis.
The DSR is computed from epanetCPA simulations lasting
2 days, for blackouts lasting 12 hours and starting either at
noon or midnight of the first day. Different starting times
allow to study the effects of power line failures during peri-
ods characterized by the prevalence of high (start=noon) or
low water demand (midnight). For a more robust evaluation
of the impacts, the DSR is computed for 10 different ran-
domizations of the initial conditions (i.e., initial water levels
in the tanks) of C-Town. The same set of random initial
conditions are used across all experiments for consistency.
In summary, the experiments consist of a total of 22,320
simulations, obtained by crossing the 6x186 power failure
scenarios with the 20 scenarios considered in epanetCPA.
The use case is evaluated through an m − 1 contingency
analysis that repeats the following process: a link is re-
moved, the power network (and its coupled water network)
undergoes a cascading failure, the DSR metric is computed
at every cascade iteration, the network is restored back to
its initial state and the whole process repeats for all m − 1
link removals. This analysis characterizes probabilistically
the overall network reliability, and it is regarded a state of
the art evaluation method for power networks [13, 9, 20].
3.2 Interconnected Power-to-Water Network
Table 2 shows the impact of the cascading failures on the
6 load buses that energize C-Town, for the considered values
of α. Note that for α = 1, on average only 1.1 of the buses
remains powered, while always at least one of the load buses
is without power. For this α, the removal of 56 out of the 186
links, leave all 6 buses without power. Clearly, the average
number of powered buses increases with α.
Table 2: Impact of cascading failures on the 6 buses,
shown as the minimum, average and maximum num-
ber of buses that still receive power after the cas-
cading failure.
Tolerance parameter α Min. Avg. Max.
1.0 0 1.1 5
1.2 1 3,9 6
1.4 2 5,2 6
1.6 4 5,7 6
1.8 4 5,8 6
2.0 4 5,8 6
Figure 2, which depicts the case-118 power network, illus-
trates the relation between failures in the power network and
shortage of water supply in C-Town. In particular, the figure
shows how the deactivation of a power line in case-118 influ-
ences the DSR of C-Town, where the DSR is averaged across
all demand nodes and 10 randomized initial conditions. The
thickness and color of each link, are a proxy for the impact
of its failure on the DSR. The maps in the first row corre-
sponds to a tolerance parameter α = 1 at noon (left) and
at midnight (right). The maps in the second row both cor-
respond to a start at noon, with α = 1.4 (left) or α = 1.8
(right). Shaded bus numbers indicate load buses supplying
energy to C-Town hydraulic components. A power line rep-
resented with a red thick segment indicates that the damage
following an initial failure in that specific line causes severe
shortages of water supply across the whole network (low
DSR). Intuitively, this happens because the power network
disruption disconnects the load buses supplying energy to
key hydraulic components, thereby disabling them. On the
other hand, thin blue segments indicate that the power line
deactivation does not lead to significant cascading failures,
that is, the line deactivation does not alter the operations of
the interconnected water distribution system (high DSR).
From the maps it is evident that both tolerance parame-
ter α and timing of power line failures have a major impact
on DSR. For failures happening at noon, the overall average
values of DSR fall to a minimum of 0.872 when the network
is at full capacity (α = 1.0, Figure 2a). In this scenario, the
removal of 56 power lines leave all 6 load buses that ener-
gize C-Town, without power. So, all these cases lead to the
same low DSR, as depicted by the thick red lines. Note that
the removed links do not necessarily need to be close to the
buses that energize C-Town, see for instance the low DSR
associated with links in the top corners of Figure 2a. This
phenomenon progressively disappears when higher values of
α are used (Figure 2c and 2d). In these scenarios, the links
leading to low DSR values are only the ones causing an out-
age of bus 108, which energizes the main pumping station
S1 (Table 1). For instance, for α = 1.4, the removal of link
100-104 leads to a DSR of about 0.85.
Our results further show that events happening at mid-
night result in similar, but dampened effects on water sup-
ply. The reason behind this result stands in the night de-
mand patterns, which are consistently lower than the after-
noon ones. Also for the night-time scenarios it is possible
to appreciate the importance of links nearby load bus 108,
whose deactivation causes substantial reductions of water
supply.
Further insights for the events starting at noon are re-
vealed by Figure 3, which illustrates the relation between the
percentage of deactivated power lines and the average DSR
(for different values of α). For the extreme case of α = 1.0,
C-Town always experiences a water shortage (DSR< 1.0),
regardless of which link is initially deactivated. The situ-
ation steadily improves as α increases, with only 20% of
power line deactivations causing unmet water demands for
the highest values of α. This said, it is important to note
that, even in the least critical conditions (i.e., α = 1.8 or
2.0), there still exists a small fraction of links (around 2%)
whose deactivation causes severe water shortages.
4. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
The paper investigates the impact of cascading power fail-
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(a) α = 1.0, start=noon, overall avg. DSR=0.872
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(b) α = 1.0, start=midnight, overall avg. DSR=0.904
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(c) α = 1.4, start=noon, overall avg. DSR=0.971
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(d) α = 1.8, start=noon, overall avg. DSR=0.990
Figure 2: Average DSR due to cascading failures triggered by the deactivation of a power link. The first
row corresponds to the case α = 1, with power line deactivated at noon (left) and midnight (right). For the
second row power line deactivation occurs at noon, with α = 1.4 (left) and α = 1.8 (right). The reported
overall average DSR is the network-wide mean of the average DSR for each demand node. The shaded load
buses are those supplying power to the hydraulic components (see Table 1).
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Figure 3: Percentage of deactivated power lines resulting in average DSR below a certain threshold (events
starting at noon).
ures on interconnected power-to-water networks. Experi-
ments carried out for a realistic synthetic example show that
cascading effects cause the deactivation of the load buses
energizing the hydraulic components, resulting in significant
water shortages even for failures originating in distant power
lines. This is particularly true for power networks which are
heavily loaded before the failure takes place, although severe
water shortages may occur even for less critical conditions.
These results showcase the strong dependency of urban wa-
ter supply systems on the reliability of power networks, and
suggest that approaches addressing the complexity of in-
terconnected systems are more suitable to design resilient
infrastructure. Further work may study the impact of cas-
cading power failures on water quality or on other water
networked infrastructure, such as urban drainage systems.
These investigations can be respectively carried out by ex-
tending the water distribution simulation module with a wa-
ter quality engine, or by replacing it with a storm-water
management model [5].
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